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NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Plaintiffs-Respondents
against various Defendants for collection of a promissory
note, foreclosure of an equitable loan, and for damages
arising from various violations of state securities law.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant Grant

c.

Mills failed to answer Plaintiffs'

Complaint and a default judgment was taken against him in
July of 1981.
j~dgment

In December of 1981 he requested that the

be set aside.

This motion was denied by the lower

court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY RESPONDENTS
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek aff irmance of the lower
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court judgment and the order of the lower court declining
to set aside the default judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The "Statement of Fact:S" submitted by Appellant fails
to include several facts which are pertinent to this appeal.
In addition, Appellant has distorted other facts in his own
favor rather than correctly reciting the actual event as
evidenced by the record.

For these reasons, therefore,

Respondents shall briefly restate the facts.
On July 1, 1981 this action was initiated in a Complaint
filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County.
Plaintiffs David Russell and Eileen Russell brought an
action against numerous defendants based upon several theories
of law including collection of a promissory note, foreclosure
of an equitable lien, and violation of various state securities
laws.

2-17) .

(R.

On July 7, 1981 defendant Grant Mills was duly served
and a constable's return was filed with the District Court.
(R. 22-23) .

On July 29 a default certificate was entered

by the Clerk against Grant
Complaint.

(R. 38).

c.

Mills for failing to answer the

Concurrently, a hearing was held before

the District Court at which time a judgment was entered
against the defendant Grant C. Mills in the amount of $63,266
together with attorneys' fees of $5,000, and costs of the
action.

(R. 39).

The District Court executed an order
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stating there was no just reason for delay in the entry of
final judgment.

(R. 36).

On December 4, 1981 Grant C. Mills filed a motion to
set aside the default.

(R. 53-54).

At this time affidavits

of Mr. Mills, Annette VomDorp and Ron Stenger were also
filed.

(R. 56-64).

Subsequently, on December 9, 1981 affidavits were filed
on behalf of Plaintiffs by Plaintiffs' attorneys David Hardy
and Earl Tanner and by plaintiff David Russell.

(R. 42-48).

A hearing was held by the District Court on December 10,
1981 and the motion to set aside was denied.
order that the present appeal is taken.

It is from this

(R. 78).

The Affidavits filed by .both parties describe a series
of events which occurred in the litigation and which were
considered by the lower court in the motion to set aside the
default judgment.

The chronological sequence of events as

described in these affidavits are as follows:
Appellant Grant C. Mills was served with a Summons and
Complaint on July 7, 1981.

(Mills Affidavit, R. 56).

Mills

then contacted Ronald Stenger, an attorney in Provo, Utah
who instructed him to forward a copy of the Summons and
Complaint to his office so that the same could be reviewed
for preparation of an Answer to the Complaint.
Affidavit, R. 56).

(Mills

Mills· stated that he forwarded a copy

of the Summons and Complaint to Stenger by mail.

(Mills
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Affidavit, R. 57) .
The attorney, Ronald Stenger, in his affidavit agreed
that he had been contacted by Mills and that he had told him
to send him a copy of the Summons and Complaint.

Stenger

sta.ted he did not recall receiving the Summons. and Complaint
but that "circumstances in Affiant's office at the time might
have contributed to confusion regarding the necessity of
response to said Complaint."

(Stenger Affidavit, R. 62).

Stenger stated that the confusion may have resulted because
Stenger was representing other defendants in the same lawsuit.
"At any rate Affiant's office failed to file an Answer on

Mr. Mill's behalf."

(Stenger Affidavit, R. 36).

Stenger

stated he did not inform Mills that an Answer had not been
filed on his behalf.

(Stenger Affidavit, R. 63).

Stenger claimed to have had a conversation with Plaintiff's
attorney, Earl Tanner, who indicated that Plaintiffs' primary
interest was in obtaining a judgment against the corporate
defendants and that he was less concerned with obtaining
judgment against the individual defendants.
R. 63) .

(Stenger Affidavit,

This conve~sation was denied in an affidavit filed

by Mr. Tanner.

(Tanner Affidavit, R. 45).

This dispute,

however, is immaterial to this appeal.
The plaintiff David Russell declared in his affidavit
that on or about July 15, 1981 he had a conversation with
defendant Grant C. Mills at which time Mills informed Russell
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that Mills intended to take no action on the Summons and
Complaint filed by Russell.

(Russell Affidavit, R. 47).

This is not contradicted by Mills and must, therefore, be
taken as true.
Tanner stated in his affidavit that on August 10, 1981

in a conversation with attorney Stenger the latter advised
him that he would represent only defendants Robert L. Moody,
Thomas S. Taylor, Gene Thurman, Merrill G. Moody, G. David
McKell, and James C. Hill.

Tanner agreed not to enter a

money judgment against these clients if Stenger would consent
to a judgment clearing them from the title, which was done.
(Tanner Affidavit, R. 45) .
An associate of Mr. Tanner also filed an affidavit.
David Hardy stated in his affidavit that on August 18, 1981
he received a telephone call from defendant Grant

c.

Mills

and that during the course of the conversation Hardy specif ically reminded Mills that a default judgment had been taken
against him to which defendant Mills replied that he did not
feel "he was legally obligated to the plaintiffs and therefore did not feel motivated by the lawsuit filed against him
by Plaintiffs to address Plaintiffs' claims."
davit, R. 42).

(Hardy Affi-

This statement, also, was not denied by Mills.

Appellant Mills in his affidavit stated that he was not
informed by Mr. Stenger that he had not undertaken the defense
and had assumed that an Answer had been filed on his behalf·.
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He stated that he initiated steps to determine that his
defense had in fact been undertaken by Stenger and that no
judgment had been entered against him by instructing his
employee Annette Vern Dorp to contact the Salt Lake County
Clerk to inquire whether or not a judgment had been entered
against him.

(Mills Affidavit, R. 57).

Annette Vern Dorp in her affidavit stated that on
September 4, 1981 she contacted the Salt Lake County Clerk's
office and was told that no judgment had been entered against
Mills but that judgment had been entered against other
defendants.

(Vern Dorp Affidavit, R. 60).

Mills then stated· that he relied upon the representations
of the Salt Lake County Clerk and assumed that Stenger had
undertaken his defense.

Mills makes no claim that he ever

directly asked Stenger if an Answer had been filed or
whether he was in default.

Mills stated further that he

first learned that a judgment had been entered against him
when he received a copy of the Writ of Execution issued by
the Third District Court on November 24, 1981.

(Mills Affi-

davit, R. 57).
He then stated that he made a second inquiry to the
Salt Lake County Clerk's office on November 25, 1981 and
was again informed that no judgment had been entered against
him.

He instructed his new attorney, Jeffrey L. Silvestrini

to investigate the matter and learned that a judgment had
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indeed been entered on July 29, 1981.

(Mills Affidavit,

R. 5 7) •

Defendant Mills in his affidavit claimed that the
judgment itself was incorrect in that interest had not
been computed in determining the final amount of judgment.
He stated in his affidavit that in a conversation with Mr.
Tanner, Tanner admitted that the amount may be wrong but
would not correct the amount of the judgment since the extra
amount would be used to compensate the plaintiffs for money
which they were required to pay for counsel.
R. 58-59).

(Mills Affidavit,

This statement was denied by Mr. Tanner.

(Tanner

Affidavit, R. 45) .
The remaining portions of the Affidavits filed recited
conclusions drawn by the various affiants as to the effects
of the default.

For example, attorney Stenger stated that

he believed it would be unjust for the default judgment to
stand due to the fact that Mr. Mills

~cted

in good faith

in contacting him and in forwarding the Sununons and Complaint
to his office.

In his opinion Mills had a good defense to

Plaintiffsl claim.

Further, he stated that there would be

no prejudice by allowing the default to be set aside since
other actions against the remaining defendants were still
pending.

(Stenger Affidavit, R. 63-64) .

Likewise, Mills stated, in his opinion, he had valid
defenses to the action ·and that it would be unjust to allow
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the judgment to stand since he had in good faith tendered
the defense to his licensed attorney and felt that the matter
had been answered by Stenger based upon his inquiries with
the Clerk's office.

(Mills Affidavit, R. 58).

He felt

that to allow the judgment to stand would work an injustice
upon him.

(Id.)

Finally, attorney Tanner stated that Plaintiffs would
be greatly prejudiced by the. setting aside of the default
since Mills had sold securities of approximately $2 million
similar to those involved in the instant case and therefore
many persons may have a cause of action against defendants
which would prejudice the plaintiffs in collection of the
judgment if it were set aside.

(Tanner Affidavit, R. 45).

The lower court reviewed these affidavits together with
legal memoranda submitted by both parties and denied the
motion to set aside the judgment.

(R. 72).

An order to

stay the execution of the Mills property was entered by
the lower court on December 15, 1981.

(R. 74).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Appellant in his brief states what he believes to be
the applicable standard of review in an appeal based upon
a failure to set aside a default judgment.
Brief, pp. 4-5).

(Appellant's

Respondents believe that a clearer statement

-8-
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of this standard was recited in this Court's opinion of
Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1979).

This Court

stated the following rules applicable to these types of
cases:
While we agree that trial courts should
be generally indulgent toward permitting full
inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can
be settled advisedly and in conformity with
law and justice, . . . each case must nevertheless depend upon its own peculiar facts and
circumstances.
"No general rule can be laid
down respecting the discretion to be exercised·
in setting aside or refusing to set aside a
judgment by default. . . but the discretion
should always be so exercised as to promote the
ends of justice . . . . " (Citations omitted).
Appellant and Respondents both agree that the decision of
whether to set aside a default judgment is a discretionary
matter.

This Court recognized that the lower court dis-

cretion would only be reversed "if it is clear the court
abused that discretion."
This Court in Heath then quoted with approval the language contained in Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513
P.2d 429 (Utah 1973), where the balancing of interests is
explained together with the concept that the balancing
initially is left to the lower court.

That decision stated:

The trial court must balance two valid
considerations; on the one hand, to relieve
the party of the judgment vitiates the effect
of res judicata and it creates a hardship for
the successful litigant by causing him to
prosecute more than once his action and
subjecting him to possible loss of collecting
his judgment. On the other hand, the court
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desires to protect the losing party who has not
had the opportunity to present his claim or
defense. The rule that the courts will incline
towards granting relief to a party, who has not
had the opportunity to present his case, is
ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and
this court will not reverse the determination
of the trial court merely because the motion
could have been granted.
597 P.2d at 858.
Appellant suggests several questions to be determined
on the appeal based upon the standard of appellate review.
Respondents, however, disagree that these are the relevant
questions to be determined on appeal.

Rather, Respondents

submit that this Court should direct its attention solely
to these questions:
(1)

Did the appellant make timely application to

have the judgment set aside?
(2)

Did the lower court abuse its discretion in finding

that Appellant's conduct did not justify vacation of the
judgment?
A.

The Lower Court Properly Denied Appellant's Motion

to Set Aside the Judgment Since Such Motion was Not Timely
Made.
Appellant states in his brief that the circumstances of
this case "obviously do not fall within subparagraph (2),

(3),

(4) or (6) of Rule 60(b) and while it is less obvious, they
do not fall within subparagraph (1) either."

Appellant then

states:
Mills' actions do not constitute mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect.
Rather,

-10-
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he did everything reasonably expected of him
and perhaps more. But despite his diligence,
he has not had an opportunity to present his
case, through no fault of his own. That
certainly constitutes "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment" within subparagraph (7) of Rule 60(b).
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8).
Thus, Appellant attempts to argue that his grounds for
relief are pursuant to subparagraph (7) of Rule 60(b) and
not subparagraph (1).

The obvious reason for this argu-

ment is simply ·the fact that paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4
require a party to move for vacation of the default judgment
within three (3) months after the judgment was taken.

There

is no such time limitation as to subdivision (7).
Thus, before it can be determined whether Appellant
timely filed to set aside the default judgment it must first
be determined whether his asserted grounds for relief comes
under subdivision (1) or subdivision (7).

Respondents sub-

mit that without question, and in spite of Appellants'
attempt to the contrary, any excuse which Appellant can now
as~ert

would have come within the

me~ning

of subsection (1)

in that the conduct would have been constituted, at most,
as "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect."
Viewing the allegations of Appellant most favorably to
him reveals that the main thrust of his claim to set aside
the judgment was simply that he relied upon Mr. Sten~er to
file an Answer on his behalf but that Mr. Stenger did not do
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so.

However, there are really two subparts to this assertion.

First, what effect does the conduct of Appellant's attorney
have upon the setting aside of a default judgment?

Second,

did Appellant's own actions, independent of his attorney's,
justify relief from judgment.
If it is assumed that Mr. Stenger forgot to file an
Answer on behalf of Appellant (even though Stenger never
admits to having received the Summons and Complaint) the
conduct of Appellant's attorney (even assuming that there was
an attorney-client relationship) would clearly come under
subdivision (1) of Rule 60(b).
In Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d 739 {Ariz. 1980) the
Supreme Court of Arizona dealt with the identical question
as to whether the alleged neglect of a party's attorney constituted a subdivision (1) or subdivision (7) claim.

[It

should be noted that Utah's Rule 60(b) is contained as 60(c)
in the Arizona code and that

sub~ection

(7) is subsection (6)

in the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.]

The Arizona Supreme

Court stated the following:
Defendants also claim that the default judgment
should have been set aside due to gross neglect of
their counsel under Rule 60(c) (6):
"[A]ny other
reason justifying relie·f from the operation of the
judgment" . . . . Under Rule 60(c) the neglect of
their attorney is attributed to defendants "and
only when the attorney's omission or failure to act
is legally excusable may relief be obtained."
Treadaway v. Meador, 103 Ariz. 83, 84, 436 P.2d
902, 903 (1968).
Defendants' contention that after
the time has expired for making a motion for relief
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from a judgment for excusable neglect under Rule
60{c) (1), a motion may still be made under Rule
60{c) (6) for relief from a j.udgrnent due to gross
neglect, or neglect which is not excusable, is
illogical. We hold that motions for relief from
final judgm~-nts based upon neglect must be filed
under Rule 60(c) (1), not Rule 60(c) (6). Accord.,
Clamprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 {1949).
619 P.2d at 744.
In Tahoe Village Realty v. Desmet, 590 P.2d Ll58 (Nev.
1979) the defendants asserted that they believed their attorney
had filed a responsive document to plaintiff's complaint and
therefore the failure of the attorney was excusable neglect.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court was not
bound to declare the conduct of appellants' attorney as
"excusable" pursuant to Section 60(b) (1) of the Nevada Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, any conduct of appellant himself would also
fall under the

subsect~on

(1) category.

It should be observed

that Appellant never states in his affidavit that he contacted
Stenger in order to determine whether Stenger had received
the Summons and Complaint mailed or whether an Answer had
been filed.

Rather, he contacted the Salt Lake County Clerk's

office in September, nearly two months after he had been
served, to determine whether the case had yet gone to judgment.
Had the appellant made proper inquiry from the person he
claimed to be his own attorney, he would have discovered the
"mistake" in failing to file an Answer within the three-month
statutory period.

It is clear that both the conduct of Stenger
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and the conduct of Appellant, based upon their own affidavits, must be classified under subsection (1) of Rule
60 (b) .
This Court in Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah
1977) rejected a s.imilar attempt of a party to urge $Ubsection
(7) rather than (1) when the time for objecting had expired.
This Court stated the following:
It seems ~nescapable, also, to conclude that
Rule 60 (b) (1) . is .applicable here in the letter and
spirit of rules governing procedure and practice
and the doctrine of the exercise of diligence in
the presentation of ones rights, failing which
they are amenable to a limitation statutory feature
looking to repose of litigation after a reasonable
time, inter.dieted here to be three months under
Rule 6 0 ( b) ( 1 ) .
.

.

See also, Robinson v. Myers, 599

P~2d

513 (Utah-1979); J.P.

w.

Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979) where this
Court rejected other attempts to use subdivision (7} in place
of subdivision (1) .
Thus, it can be assuemd without much doubt that the
three-month statutory time period for setting aside a default
as provided in Rule 60 (b} (1) was applicable to this
The default was taken on July 29, 1981.

case..

The motion to set

aside the default was filed on December 4, 1981 which was
clearly beyond the three-month time period, and the affidavits
of Appellants themselves clearly show that either Appellant
or his counsel neglected to pay timely attention to the case.
Appellant seems to argue that even if it is assumed that
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the three-month period is applicable that Appellant is still
,,..

timely.

Appellant submits that "reasons suggest-that the

three-month limitation would not begin to run until the
judgment debtor has notice of the entry of the judgment.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 9).

Appellant asserts that it was

the obligation of Respondents to notify him of the default
and that until such notification was made the three-month time
period did not begin to run.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10).

This argument is completely void of merit.

There was

no obligation on the part of Respondents to notify Appellant
that a default judgment had been taken against him.

Rule

SS(b) U.R.C.P. specifically provides in subsection (2) the
following:
Notice to Party in Default. After the entry
of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a) (1) of this Rule, it shall not be
necessary to give such party in default any notice
of action taken or to be taken or to serve any
notice or paper otherwise required by these Rules
to be served on a party to the action or proceeding,

.. ..

Since Respondents were not obligated to inform Appellant of
the default judgment, even if Appellant claims that notification did not occur until after the three-month time period
had elapsed were true, it would be immaterial.

However,

this is not true.
The undisputed affidavit of Plaintiffs' attorney reveals
that on August 18, 1981 he told Appellant that a default
judgment had been taken against him but that Appellant replied
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"

he did not believe he was legally obligated to respond
and therefore was not going to do anything.

(R. 42-43).

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure puts the burden on
Appellant-to monitor the litigation after he has been seJ;"ved
with notice that the lawsuit has been commenced against him.
The cases relied upon by Appellant to support his contention are inappropriate.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11).

In Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961)
the court held that if a showing were made that the district
court had reversed the decision of the city court on an appeal
without due notice of

such~appeal

or the

p~oceedings

in the

district court, that the prevailing party in the city court
could establish lack of due process of law and would be
entitled to relief from judgment of the district court.

The

instant case, of course, does not involve an appeal or lack
of notice of the appeal.
In Central Finance Co. v. Kynaston, 452 P.2d 316 (Utah
1969) the court remanded that case to the lower court to
determine whether the· district court clerk had failed to
notify the defendant's attorney of the time of trial in violation of a specific court rule of that district.

This Court

observed that in the absence of a specific rule of court,
attorneys are not entitled to rely upon clerks
give them notice of trial settings.

of courts to

Again, the instant

case does not involve the failure of the parties to attend
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a trial and, in fact, Rule 54(b) (2) specifically states
that no notice is required as to defaults.
Finally, in Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Egla Development, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) a similar question as to
notification of a trial date was presented after the def endant claimed that his attorney had withdrawn and that he
never received notice of the date from the opposing counsel
or the court clerk.
Obviously, these cases do not stand for the proposition
that "notice" in a default judgment must be given to the
defaulting party, and even if they did, actual notice was
in fact given in the instant case.
Thus, the lower court correctly denied Appellant's motion
to set aside the judgment, ruling that Appellant had failed
to file the motion within. the applicable time limit.

Appellant's

affidavits show neglect on the part of both Mills and Stenger.
Whether the neglect

was excusable or unexcusable, matters not.

The only grounds supported by affidavit fall under subdivision
(1) of Rule 60 and, therefore, any motion based on these excuses
must be brought· within the three-month time period.

Appellant's

failure to do so precludes any relief.
B.

Assuming Arguendo that the Motion was Timely, the

Lower Court Still did not Abuse its Discretion in Failing to
Set the Judgment Aside.
Appellant asserts,

"One might ask what more Mills should
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have done to properly defend himself in this action?"
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6). Respondents can easily answer
this question.
The attorney-client relationship between Appellant and
Stenger, based upon the affidavits of both individuals, showed
no existence of a firm arrangement whereby Stenger undertook
to represent Mills.

The fact that Stenger specifically

filed an answer for other defendants in this case, but
not Mills, would indicate that he was not representing Mills.
Further, the undisputed affidavit of Tanner says that Stenger
told him that he did not represent Mills, due to an apparent
conflict of interest.
There is nothing in the record to ever show that Mills
had any more discussions with Stenger after the initial conversation.

A reasonable person would certainly have talked

to his attorney to see if he received the pleadings and
accepted the case.

That conduct sounds more like deliberate

or reckless ;.disregard of judicial process than mere negligence.
Even after three months of silence, Mills chose to call the
Clerk's office to find out whether a judgment had been entered
against him rather than calling Stenger to see if his interests
had been represented.
Respondents submit that the affidavits of Stenger and
Mills have been written in such a manner to preclude any
assertion that Stenger actually represented Mills or that
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Stenger had been contacted by Mills as his client after the
initial conversation.
If, on the other hand, Stenger indeed failed to represent Appellant in the proceeding after agreeing to do so,
then the action lies against Stenger and not against
Respondents.

As noted earlier, the neglect of an attorney

is imputed to the client.
739 (Ariz. 1980).

Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d

If Stenger neglected to properly represent

Mills then an action against Stenger should be brought.
However, this "mistake" or "inadvertence" of Stenger cannot
be imputed to Respondents.

In Jennings v. Stoker, No. 17634

(Utah, July 28, 1982) this Court held that the alleged malpractice of a plaintiff's attorney does not justify the
granting of a new trial as against the opposing party.
same principle is applicable here.

This

Appellant's sole remedy

at this point in time is against Stenger, not Plaintiffs.
Thus, either Appellant's purported attorney Stenger or
Appellant himself was negligent in failing to respond to
the Complaint properly served by Plaintiffs.

Even if it

were assumed that the lower court had the power to consider
the question of Appellant's negligence, it cannot be said
under the affidavits here present that the lower court
abused its discretion in concluding that the neglect or
mistake shown was not "excusable".
For this reason, also, therefore, the decision of the
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lower court must be sustained.
POINT II
THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE IS PROPER AND
WAS TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 55(b) (2).
Appellant next argues that even if the default should
not have been set aside, the judgment itself is void since
the lower court failed to take evidence on the issues
presented to the court.

(Appellant's Brief, PPG 12-15).

Appellant lists eleven items upon which the lower court
supposedly should have taken evidence before rendering the
default judgment.
Again, this argument is not supported by any legal
theory.

Rule 55(b) (2) provides, as stated by Appellant,

that in cases where it is necessary to determine the amount
of damages or to establish the truth of any averment, the
court may conduct hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper.
A review of the Complaint· filed in this action clearly
shows that the amount of damages sought were clear and subject
to mathematical calculation.

(R. 2-10).

Because of this,

had Respondents desired they could have gone to the Clerk
alone for a judgment on the fixed sum of the Complaint.
55(b) (l)].

[Rule

However, Respondents went before a district court

judge to obtain their judgment and to rrake a proper showing on
attorneys' fees.
At the hearing it was necessary to produce evidence as
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to attorneys' fees.

The court will note that the order for

final judgment specifically states "that testimony had been
taken" and thereafter granted an award of attorneys' fees of
$5,000 in addition to the money judgment prayed for in the
Complaint.

(R. 36).

The question of attorneys' fees was the only matter
which required the taking of evidence.

All other items

listed by Appellant were conceded when Appellant failed to
answer the Complaint.

It is not necessary for a court to

take evidence as to the merits of the case since to do so
would require a trial on ·a default judgment.

The only require-

ment of an evidentiary hearing concerns unliqu.idated damages
such as claims of general dal}lages or punitive damages in which
the amounts cannot be ascertained from the pleadings themselves.
Pitts v. Pine Meadows Ranch, Inc., 589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978).
For example, whether Mills was in fact a licensed
securities agent, whether the note constituted a security,
whether any representations were made to the Russells by
Mills, whether the representations were true or false, etc.
are all questions which were conceded when Appellant failed
to answer the Complaint.
Likewise, if the Complaint stated an incorrect amount
as to the amount owing on the note and failed to take into
account alleged payments which had been made, this too was
waived by Appellant when he failed to answer.

It must be
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assumed that the amount stated in the Complaint is conceded
to by the party in default or otherwise even amounts which
are stated as a sum certain would require evidence contrary
to Rule 55 (b) .
The only amount claimed in the Complaint requiring
evidence was attorneys' fees.

The record shows that a hearing

was held and evidence was taken. as to the reasonableness of
attorneys' fees.

The language of a judgment is deemed to be

correct in the absence of contrary evidence.
Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981).

Hutcheson v.

The Appellant has failed

to produce any evidence disputing the reasonableness of the
attorneys' fees or evidence showing that an evidentiary
hearing was.not in fact held.

It is the burden of the

appellant to support his allegations with evidence or at
least with a record of the lower court proceedings.

v. Garrand, 615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980).

Garrand

It must therefore be

assumed that the lower court conducted a proper hearing and
concluded that $5,000 was in fact a reasonable attorneys'
fee based upon the numerous circumstances in the litigation.
In any event, even if the lower court improperly failed
to take evidence as to the amount of damages the remedy is
to remand for a further evidentiary hearing not to vacate
the judgment.

Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589 P.2d 767

(Utah 1978); J. P. W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d
486 (Utah 1979).
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The plaintiffs in this case properly followed the procedure for obtaining a default judgment based upon an
ascertained sum.

A hearing in fact was held as to

attorneys' fees and there exists in the present record no
evidence that the court falsely stated it had taken evidence,
or that the amount awarded is not reasonable.

The~efore,

Appellants' claim that Rule SS(b) was not followed is without
merit.

CONCLUSION
The rules providing for defaults were formulated to
provide

an expedient. method of obtaining judgment when no

contest of issues is present.

The rules developed to relieve

a party of judgment were likewise engineered· to prevent
injustice to a defaulting party while, at the same time,
providing safeguards to the party taking the default.
Here, the affidavits filed by Appellant establish a
course of conduct that did not allow relief from the default
judgment entered against him.

His supposed reliance upon

his attorney to answer the allegations does not allow him
relief as against Plaintiffs--his relief is against his
attorney.
Similarly, his own conduct showed a reckless indifference
to the judicial process by his failure to consult with his
attorney or to take any steps to ascertain that his interests
were being protected.

The uncontroverted affidavits show
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that Appellant did not believe he was liable to Plaintiffs
and therefore was going to do nothing about the lawsuit in
spite of

war~ings

from Plaintiffs and their attorneys.

In any event, however, the application for "excusable"
conduct was not timely made and this reason alone disposes
of any substantive arguments as to the actions of Appellant.
Under Rule 60(b} (1) the application for relief must be made
within three months of judgment--here, it was not.
Finally, the judgment itself was valid since the lower
court properly entered judgment for a fixed sum as plead in
Plaintiffs' Complaint and took evidence as to attorneys' fees.
Neither the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor simple logic
dictat·e that a full evidentiary trial must be held -for each
default judgment.
The decision o.f the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

~I

~Tanner,

Sr.

2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for Respondents
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